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Abstract. We propose a network-oriented privacy model (PRIVED) composed by a well defined in-
formation model, using events, information sets and relationships to define the conceptual privacy re-
lationships that can occur in the network. We propose formal rules and a network instantiation, using
linkability and correlation as the main tools for network applicability. We also use the model to deter-
mine the best approaches towards privacy protection in the network, resulting in a vertical/horizontal
network privacy dichotomy.
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1 Introduction
Privacy is a complex and multi-disciplinary concept that covers technological, legal, social and even philo-
sophical issues. When considering individual user privacy in modern networks, we must isolate different
views, each with its own set of threats, turning privacy in the network into a tractable problem. In this
paper, the concept of network privacy refers to the ability of accessing the network without unwillingly
revealing information about user or device. Therefore it becomes important to understand how information
is leaked (or revealed) by accessing the network.
An approach to network privacy is to define a privacy model that covers the information related to
the different network assets. It should identify what information jeopardizes privacy, so that a clear set
of mitigation measures can be proposed. Different privacy models exist using different concepts, such as
databases [5], anonymity [1, 6], network [8] or bayesian approaches [7]. However, most of them do not deal
directly with the network, creating a gap. Network privacy requires a specific model, that identifies network
based privacy threats. To close this gap, we propose a novel network oriented privacy model based on Events
as a bridge between conceptual approaches and practical network applications, leading to Relationships and
Information Sets. The relationships can be seen as the privacy threats, whereas the information sets represent
the collected information about users, all of them using events as the basic operation. These events, which
can be extracted from network observation (e.g. exchanged data packets) are at foundation of the presented
work, providing a simple information model that uses resorts to event information extraction and correlation.
The model is then adapted to the network, in Sec. 3, through the formalization of Linkage and Correlation
as network observations, especially considering mobile networks, which are a key aspect in this respect, as
they increase information correlation, besides increasing the means for tracking the location of end-points.
Such formalizations provide the starting point for defining identifier based threats, as well as protection
mechanisms. By defining the means for breaking relationships between events and containment barriers for
the information sets, discussed in Sec. 4, these concepts can be used to define abstract privacy protection
mechanisms for the network stack. We conclude by reviewing the contributions of proposed work in Sec. 5.
2 Privacy Model
Packet based networks can be characterized by information blocks, exchanged and stored across the network,
depending on context and purpose. We define a network oriented model where information can be extracted
from these blocks, or even from relationships between different blocks, threatening privacy by attributing
data to identifiable subjects - the users. Based on network protocol semantics, we assume that information
can be split into data, a generic block that by itself can have no particular meaning towards a subject,
and identifiers, which can uniquely identify or represent the subject to whom the data belongs, similar to
Quasi-Identifiers [2], which can be used for privacy in databases [5]. Therefore, it is possible to separate
privacy in the network into identifier threats and data mining threats. We focus on identifiers, which can be
used to relate different information blocks (Figure 1). Once a relationship is established - which is where the
privacy threat resides - a larger set is built, resulting in aggregated information. This view represents the
notion of a user as the knowledge gained around a certain subject. By relying on concept that it is possible
to gather information into specific sets, we propose a Privacy Event Driven (PRIVED) model, that uses the
concepts of events, information sets and the relationships to model privacy breaches on the network.
ex = (identifier, [subject, ]information) (1)
To understand how these relationships are established, where information stems from, and how to build
and maintain a larger notion of relationships, we propose a three-fold approach that tries to model network
behavior. We use discrete Events (1), ex, which convey information blocks along with potential information
for relationship establishment, leading to Relationships, ϕ(ex, ey), and Information Sets (IS). IS are an
aggregate set of information that is composed by different information blocks (or events) that share a
relationship greater than a define threshold, t, as show by 2, whereas relationships are the links between
events or sets that enable building the IS. Events matter because they can model the occurrence of information
in the network. Also, by concatenating several packets (or events) through the relationships between them,
it is possible to build a larger information set that will surely include private information about the user,
that was not intended for public release.
S = {e1, e2, e3, . . . , en}, ϕ(ex, ey) ≥ t (2)
2.1 Events and Information Sets
ϕ(e1,e2) ≥ t⇒ e3(e1, e2, ϕe1,e2) (3)
Using events, it is possible to link information and establish relationships that jeopardize user privacy
through direct observations or probabilistic evidence gathering (taking into account different network con-
ditions, information relevance and even previous observations), assuming that if if a relationship with value
greater than the defined threshold, we define an event that relates them (3).
Event correlation also complements the construction of the information set, which can be done through
linkage and correlation on the network. When an identifier refers to a subject or user, it allows building
an information set around it. Therefore, if two identifiers relate to the same subject, we can expand the
information set (4). This defines the correlation process, where identifiers become the common ground to
threaten user privacy and can hold true for any type of data (e.g. addresses, location, bandwidth, services,
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Fig. 1. Abstract information model
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eye color, height, etc.). Similarly, when two different sets share an event, or there is a relationship between
two events, they become the same expanded IS, as detailed in (5).
ex ∈ sk, ey, ϕ(ex, ey)⇒ ey ∈ Sk (4)
Part of the proposed model includes formal rules for building the information set using Set Theory [3],
which is a generalization of network identifier based rules that we presented in [4]. We also express several
cases where graph theory is superior for handling identifier relationships within sets, and how to use the
model for expressing formal rules of existing work (thus incorporating the Freiburg Privacy Diamond [8]).
ei ∈ Si, ej ∈ Sj : ϕ(ei, ej)⇒ Sk = Si ∪ Sj (5)
3 Privacy in the Network
ex(eL2, eL3) (6)
In network terms, events are data packets: each one has unique identifiers or circumstances, containing
data (or payload) which can be linked or mined for more information. Therefore, the established relationships
lead to linkage between independent (discrete) packet observations in the network. We can highlight several
means of identifier driven correlation, such as time-based, contextual, or layered. The plethora of available
identifiers, such as link, network or transport layer identifiers, create several threats, and can be aggregated
into a network based information set, jeopardizing user privacy. Furthermore, the importance conferred to
identifiers provides a strong connection between the model and mobile networks, given that the relationships
between identifiers and network properties define several threats only important in mobile environments,
such as location (provided by different identifier types). The mentioned relationships can follow two dis-
tinct approaches: relationships can be established based on a single event that conveys distinct information
(identifiers), or multiple events related together through network techniques or inference.
This allows defining linkage according to two vectors: Vertical Linkage as the correlation of identifiers
present in a single event, typically by observing multiple layer identifiers in one packet, and Horizontal
Linkage, dealing with relationships between identifiers of the same nature (belonging to the same layer,
horizontally on the network) and leading to relationships between multiple events. These definitions make
a concrete difference in the network, directly mapping to Fig. 2(a), which represents linking between link
layer identifiers and IP addresses shown in Fig. 2(a), formally described as an event that relates two other
events (6). A similar process for identifiers in the same layer is shown in Fig. 2(b). These different relation-
ships are specially important in mobile networks, where the means of correlation are supported by location
properties and exchanged information, which provide more information for both vertical and horizontal
linkage (e.g. events sharing similar locations can be bound together). The proposed network properties are
consequences of the privacy model, using the event rules to define these types of relationships on the network,
thus bridging the practical and theoretical approaches. In the proposed work, these rules are completed by
a study on the different identifiers properties (e.g addressing structures) and their contributions to the IS.
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Fig. 2. Vertical and horizontal linkage on the network.
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4 Network Privacy Protection
Understanding (and proposing) privacy models is only important when they contribute towards privacy
preservation. So far we’ve isolated two different ways to undermine privacy: the establishment of relationships
between events and the aggregation of those events into an IS. To protect privacy, it is necessary to break
the relationships between events thus preventing them from being aggregated into an IS.
We can break relationships by protecting identifiers, avoiding any privacy leakage. Because most threats
on network identifiers stem from the vertical or horizontal threats, we propose using vertical or horizontal
barriers, promoting vertical separation. With a horizontal barrier (e.g. opaque tunnels like TLS or IPSec)
between different layers, an identifier conveyed by lower layers is hidden and unavailable to any attacker on
the network, thus providing a horizontal separation mechanism as a shield between layers. Alternatively, we
can protect the user’s privacy as a whole by preventing information from being aggregated in the IS. This
can be done with vertical approaches that enable controlling the disclosed identifiers (e.g. pseudonymity),
therefore defining boundaries and rules for the IS. Therefore, privacy mechanisms can be coupled with
different techniques, such as identity, to reduce the size of IS by using transient identifiers (e.g. network
pseudonyms) that loose relative importance and contribute to much smaller information sets, but require a
vertical coordinated approach.
5 Conclusion
The PRIVED model introduces the concepts of Event, Relationship and Information Set. The IS frames
user information, directed towards the network, while the events translate network interactions into data
blocks, related through relationships that threaten privacy. However, the model is directly applicable to
network paradigms, through the defined information model. By discussing how linking and correlation occurs
on the network, we show the usefulness of the model, and derive how to provide network privacy. We
establish horizontal and vertical relationships between network identifiers that result in privacy loss, along
with conceptual approaches to mitigate such threats. One of the most important conclusions of identifiers
and network as a whole, is that protocols can compromise above layers, thus jeopardizing privacy throughout
the network stack using the vertical and horizontal conceptualizations. This promotes a two-fold approach
where two dimensions present a conceptualization of privacy threats and solutions: the vertical aspects that
are directly related to the user and must be handled vertically, and the horizontal aspects deal with each
individual protocol or layer, and can be handled orthogonally (provided there is a vertical solution).
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